Tilton and Toole critically examine the prevailing trend of epistemic deference – where individuals are encouraged to accept the judgments of marginalized groups as their own. While acknowledging the importance of recognizing marginalized perspectives, they argue that habitual deference can inadvertently hinder the socially dominant from cultivating essential epistemic skills, such as empathy and critical inquiry.

On this episode, we return for a sequel to EP19’s topic: the potential immorality of monogamy. On that episode, we discussed Harry Chalmers’ paper “Is…

In this episode, we delve into Saul Smilansky’s provocative paper, “Should We Sacrifice the Utilitarians First?” which introduces the concept of “Designer Ethics” (DE). Smilansky argues that individuals’ moral views should influence how they are treated in moral dilemmas

In this episode, we debate a dilemma at the root of moral philosophical inquiry: either philosophers should avoid risky topics that could violate moral norms (such as expressive duties not to offend), or they must be granted some level of exemption from these duties in their professional work.

On this episode, we read Louis Pojman’s 1998 article, “The Case Against Affirmative Action”. We debate whether any of his arguments against the practice of affirmative action have any merit from the perspective of left politics. We also consider whether class-based affirmative action is preferable.

If your partner is attractive, then you might be part of the problem. At least, that’s what one edgelord philosopher is suggesting. We discuss William D’Alessandro’s forthcoming paper, “Is It Bad to Prefer Attractive Partners?” (in the Journal of the American Philosophical Association). Is this “lookism” a kind of unjustified and harmful discrimination? If it is, is it realistic to expect us to modify our personal preferences for justice-oriented reasons?